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ABSTRACT 
Many aspects of human social behavior are likely to be shaped by punishment, threats of 
punishment, and avoidance of punishment. However, surprisingly little is known about the 
psychological mechanisms underpinning these influences. The goal of the research presented 
in this thesis was to investigate how basic reinforcement-based learning processes contribute 
to adaptive social behavior. To this end, we investigated how human behavior is shaped by 
punishment and threats of punishment in simple laboratory models aimed at capturing 
essential aspects of the social world. In order to probe the mechanisms underlying overt 
behavior, we tested the capacity of simple computational models to describe human behavior.  
In Study I, we investigated how the capacity to control behavior was affected by threat of 
punishment for performance mistakes, motivated by the functional perspective that control is 
most needed when mistakes are costly, as common in social interaction. Furthermore, we 
investigated if activity in the facial corrugator supercilii muscle might function as a novel 
index of this control process. We found that performance was enhanced under threat of 
punishment relative to non-threat, and that activity in the corrugator supercilii responded to 
performance errors during threat of punishment, similar to the known electroencelographic 
correlate of performance errors, the error related negativity. 
Studies II and III investigated how social stimuli, emotional and out-group faces, affected 
avoidance learning when serving as punishers (Study II) and cues for punishment (Study 
III). In both studies, we were interested in how pre-existing negative attitudes (racial bias) 
would affect avoidance learning, motivated by the fact that social groups and group animosity 
play an important role in modern societies. We found that individual differences in racial bias 
strongly modulated avoidance learning, by leading to an increased learning rate in response to 
out-group faces (Study II) and to more biased behavior when out-group faces served as cues 
for electric shocks (Study III). Furthermore, Study III revealed that several types of social 
and non-social stimuli, which previously have been shown to be preferentially associated 
with fear (snakes, threatening faces, out-group faces, and guns), all shared a common effect 
on avoidance learning relative to control stimuli, by promoting adaptive behavior when these 
stimuli were good predictors of aversive outcomes but corrupting behavior when serving as 
bad predictors of aversive outcome. This pattern could be explained by a computational 
model positing two competing valuation systems. 
In Study IV, we asked how avoidance behaviors can be learned and transmitted socially by 
observing others´ behavior in a setting with threat of punishment. We used agent-based 
simulations to show that the omission of expected punishment together with social learning 
can explain the generation, maintenance and transmission of avoidance behaviors that form 
“avoidance traditions” on the group-level. The assumptions underlying this model were 
corroborated in four experiments, which together showed that humans are exceedingly prone 
to copy the behavior of others when threatened with punishment.  
Together, these four studies indicate that important aspects of human social behavior can be 
understood as involving mechanisms of basic reinforcement learning, and that simple 
computational models of these learning processes can provide important insights into human 
behavior. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 LEARNING IN THE AVERSIVE AND SOCIAL DOMAINS  
The overall theme of this thesis is how humans learn to avoid different types of punishment, 
such as uncomfortable electric shocks or frowning facial expressions (the aversive domain), 
in simple experimental laboratory models of social interaction (the social domain). The 
questions arising from this focus are likely: what is so important about learning in the 
aversive domain? And why is this relevant in the social domain? I will begin with sketching 
answers to these questions by providing an overview of the wider context this thesis can be 
placed in and thereafter summarize the structure of the thesis. 
Dangers, such as predation, noxious foods or hostile con-specifies are ubiquitous in the 
natural world. Exposure to such dangers is by definition costly, in terms of Darwinian fitness 
(Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013). An erroneous decision in a dangerous 
environment might be the last decision made by that individual, providing a strong selective 
pressure for optimizing behavior to avoid potentially dangerous consequences. In simple 
organisms living in stable environmental conditions, avoiding danger can be handled by hard-
wired genetic behavioral programs (Fawcett, Hamblin, & Giraldeau, 2012). However, in 
most species, the environment is complex and stochastic, which requires behavioral 
flexibility in the form of learning (Johnston, 1982). Animals learn to avoid objects or 
behaviors followed by naturally aversive consequences, such as pain or nausea. Thus, 
understanding how animals learn avoidance of punishments provides an answer to a 
fundamental aspect of survival (Bolles, 1970). 
In humans, punishment and avoidance of punishment can take many forms. Aside from 
simple primary punishments such as pain, which motivates behavior across species, humans 
are influenced by many other types of punishments, many of which are distinctly social 
(Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). Loss of money, threats to social status, social disapproval, 
gossip, ostracism and so forth are powerful influences on human behavior (note that some of 
these punishment types can also be relevant for other animals, Cant, 2011). Most importantly, 
punishment and threat of punishment are believed to be fundamental mechanisms for 
maintaining social norms, which can be defined as group-shared expectations of how 
members of the group should behave in a given situation (Bicchieri, 2005; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004). The perhaps most important social norms are those prescribing 
cooperation between unrelated individuals (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Cooperation is often 
viewed as a mystery when viewed from an evolutionary perspective; how can cooperation 
emerge and be sustained between self-interested individuals? Punishment, in a variety of 
social and non-social currencies, appears to be an important explanatory mechanism for this 
evolutionary puzzle (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 
2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2002): if people are aware of the existence 
of norm prescribing cooperation and believe that transgressions might be punished, 
cooperation can be maintained. A more mundane example might be the norms prescribing 
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which side of a street or an escalator one should use when walking (Bicchieri, 2005). 
Transgressions of such norms are likely to incur social punishment, in the form of facial 
expressions of disapproval or even verbal threats. Importantly, information about possible 
sources of punishment in the environment can often be acquired by observing the behavior of 
others. Such social learning is thought to be important for many species (Griffin, 2004; 
Olsson & Phelps, 2007), but takes especially complex forms in humans (Boyd, Richerson, & 
Henrich, 2011). In summary, much human social behavior is likely to be shaped by 
punishment, threats of punishment, and avoidance of punishment. However, surprisingly little 
is known about the psychological mechanisms underpinning these influences. 
The overall aims of this thesis was therefore to identify how punishment affects adaptive 
behavior in the social domain, by asking how threat of punishment influences the ability to 
control behavior (Study I), how the value of social stimuli, such as emotional faces, 
influences avoidance learning when serving as punishments or as cues predicting punishment 
(Study II-III), and how humans acquire and transmit avoidance behavior through observing 
the actions of others when threatened with punishment (Study IV). Together, these studies 
seek to triangulate some of the basic psychological mechanisms underpinning aversive 
learning in the social domain. The first part of this thesis (Introduction) will start with 
clarifying the theoretical framework on which this thesis builds by discussing the relationship 
between evolutionary function and psychological mechanisms. Then I will review the 
functional basis for learning, as well as characterizing two primary forms of associative 
learning. Thereafter, I will briefly describe the basic computational mechanisms of learning 
and decision making. Finally, I will summarize some important aspects of the neural 
mechanisms underlying learning with a specific focus on how these might relate to, and 
possibly explain, some of the behavioral findings presented in this thesis. 
 
1.2 FUNCTION AND MECHANISM IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
The questions posed in the studies included in this thesis are derived from a particular way of 
viewing both the purpose and the explanations given by the behavioral and cognitive sciences 
(which will be used synonymously for simplicity, as even animal learning theory involve 
“cognitive” constructs such as attention).  In short, I believe that understanding behavior both 
in the light of its putative evolutionary function and it´s mechanistic basis are important and 
mutually illuminating. This view is best defined by considering the relationship between two 
classical models, or frameworks, in biology and cognitive science: Tinbergen´s “four 
questions” and Marr´s “levels of explanation”.  Starting with the former, the Nobel laureate 
Nikolas Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963) outlined the “major problems of biology” which 
biologists working with behavior were trying to address. Full understanding of a behavioral 
trait requires answering all four questions, but they are in principle thought to be independent 
from each other.  
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These problems (sometimes phrased as questions) are; (i) what is the survival value of a 
behavioral trait, (ii) what is it´s ontogeny, (iii) how did it evolve, and (iv) what is it´s 
causation. Of these four questions, i (survival value) and iv (causation) are of direct relevance 
for this thesis. In a modern treatise on Tinbergen´s question, Bateson and Laland (Bateson & 
Laland, 2013) suggested that survival value should be rephrased as current utility, to clarify 
that the current survival value of a trait could be distinct from the survival value during earlier 
points of the species evolutionary trajectory (e.g., feathers originated for temperature 
regulation but were co-opted for flight). Regardless, Tinbergen´s first question refer to the 
function of a trait in terms of how it benefits the survival of the organism. Investigating the 
function of behavioral traits is typically the area of behavioral ecology (Winterhalder, Smith, 
& Bruce Winterhalder, 2000). The forth question, causation, refer to the mechanisms that 
generate a particular behavior.  Most fields of psychology and cognitive science are typically 
interested in mechanistic explanations of behavior. Mechanistic explanations are complicated 
by the fact that causation can be understood on different levels of explanation simultaneously. 
For example, explanations of human behavior in crowds can be posed either as due to 
physical interactions between individual agents, or by the psychological motivations 
governing these interactions, or even by the neural events underlying such motivations at the 
level of the brain (and as the interaction of atoms, and so on).  In biology, a successful 
example of how several levels of explanation can be bridged is the study of birdsong, which 
integrates mechanisms involved in gene expression, specific brain nuclei and the sensory 
input that underlie expression and learning of song  (Bateson & Laland, 2013). The problem 
of linking levels in understanding psychological mechanisms will introduced in relation to 
Marr´s levels of explanation below.  Tinbergen´s questions i and iv can be restated as a 
distinction between the ultimate and proximate level of explanation. The ultimate level of 
explanation asks why a behavior exists, whereas the proximate level of explanation asks how 
it works (Laland, Odling-Smee, Hoppitt, & Uller, 2012). Human behavioral science 
(psychology and cognitive science) have traditionally focused on the latter level by trying to 
explain how psychological mechanisms, such as attention or decision-making, works, mainly 
through direct experimental studies. This thesis can be placed in this tradition, but 
Tinbergen´s first question has been an underlying inspiration for many of the topics and 
questions addressed in the studies. Mostly, this inspiration is implicit, but in Study III and IV 
some more direct allusions to function or adaptive value are made.  
Motivating this mixture of explanational levels is my conviction that the questions worth 
asking about human psychology are those where asking about the survival value of the 
psychological trait also is meaningful. The specific perspective referred to at the outset of the 
text is thus to ask questions about psychological mechanisms in the light of evolution. Here, it 
should be emphasized that this perspective is not based upon speculation about human 
evolutionary history (so called “just so” stories), which unfortunately is relatively common 
(Bolhuis, Brown, Richardson, & Laland, 2011; Laland & Brown, 2011; Panksepp & 
Panksepp, 2000). Rather, a fruitful approach might be to investigate the psychological 
mechanisms underlying behavioral predictions from formal (evolutionary) models, or to 
 12 
device such models that might explain why a particular trait or psychological mechanism is 
observed (i.e., what is its current utility: McNamara & Houston, 2009; Trimmer, McNamara, 
Houston, & Marshall, 2012).  More informally, meaningful questions can be posed by 
devising laboratory experiments where the dependent variable by some stretch of imagination 
is related to fitness (e.g., the ability to avoid punishment). In the fields of biology and 
behavioral economy, as well as intersections of these fields such as behavioral ecology and 
neuroeconomics, investigating how a behavior works is intimately tied to why (e.g., human 
cooperation) it exists. Economy and evolutionary biology share normative theories, which 
make clear predictions of what behaviors should be observed given some underlying 
assumptions forming an analytical core (such as rationality or maximization of expected 
value) (Hammerstein & Hagen, 2005; McNamara & Houston, 2009). While such predictions 
are not always confirmed, failures commonly result in theory development. In contrast, many 
areas of psychology seem to lack both normative theories and theory development, and thus 
little progress appears to be made (Gintis, 2007). For example, many psychologists appear to 
glee in the fact that humans are not perfectly rational, without asking how such deviations 
from rationality can be understood from a normative or evolutionary perspective (Houston, 
McNamara, & Steer, 2007). Unsurprisingly, I have tried to place this thesis closer to the 
former than the latter approach.  
The topics touched upon in this thesis can be seen as related to adaptive behavior, which in 
theory function to maximize the survival of the individual. Adaptive behavior must however 
be realized by psychological mechanisms. Psychological mechanisms might have built in 
constraints with important implications for understanding how human behavior both comply 
to the predictions of normative theories, but also divergence from such predictions  (Fawcett 
et al., 2014, 2012; McNamara & Houston, 2009).  Closely related to this issue is the growing 
realization within evolutionary biology that adaptive function is constrained by the workings 
of evolved mechanisms, which often are co-opted between different behavioral domains 
(Fawcett et al., 2012; McNamara & Houston, 2009). One such fundamental mechanism, 
which is the major focus of this thesis, is the capacity for learning which contribute to 
adaptive behavior in a wide variety of settings (Bouton, 2007). Next, I expand upon the idea 
of psychological mechanisms by referring to the framework posed by Marr (Marr, 1982; 
McClamrock, 1991).  
Marr proposed a general framework for relating different levels of explanation in the 
cognitive sciences (where I include psychology for simplicity). Conceptually, this framework 
resembles the distinctions made by Tinbergen, but the domain of Marr´s framework is limited 
to Tinbergen´s causation question. The three levels in Marr´s framework are: (i) the 
computational level), (ii) the algorithmic level, and (iii) the implementation level. These 
should, as in Tinbergen´s framework, be seen as complementary and near independent 
perspectives on how a cognitive process works. The computational level concern the nature 
of the problem being solved by the cognitive system, the information involved in solving it, 
and the logic by which it can be solved. The algorithmic level specifies the representations 
and processes by which solutions to the problem are computed. Finally, the implementational 
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level specifies how these representations and processes are realized in neural terms. In this 
thesis, the primary focus is on the two first levels of explanation, although the knowledge of 
the implementational level is occasionally used to illuminate or constrain explanations on the 
other levels (especially in Study I). Ultimately, all three levels have to be understood, as well 
as the mapping between them, to explain how adaptive behavior is instigated. In Studies II-
IV, the computational and algorithmic – level analysis is conducted by constructing formal 
computational models in seeking to understand the mechanisms underlying behavior. 
 
1.3 THE FUNCTION OF LEARNING 
The basic capacity for learning, evident in humans, all vertebrates and many other species is 
an evolutionary adaption that allows flexibility in the mapping between input stimuli and 
behavioral output (Fawcett et al., 2012; McNamara & Houston, 2009; Mery & Burns, 2009; 
Snell-Rood, 2013). At its core, the function of learning is to allow the organism to procure 
rewards, such as food and mates, and avoid danger, such as predators, hostile con-specifics 
and toxic food. Such survival promoting functions can be implemented by wholly genetic 
“hardcoded” programs if the environment is highly stable (Johnston, 1982; Snell-Rood, 
2013). However, if conditions change, for example if new predators emerge or the 
distribution of food sources change, such hardcoded programs are likely insufficient for 
adaptive behavior. Learning allows the organism to adapt its behavior to such changes 
through experience, by associating stimuli or actions with aversive or beneficial outcomes. 
 A basic distinction is made between two types of associative learning: instrumental (or 
operant) conditioning, where animals learn to perform behaviors to enhance their fitness, and 
classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning, where animals learn that a stimulus (referred to as 
conditioned stimulus, CS) predicts a biologically relevant outcome, such as food or pain, 
(referred to as unconditioned stimulus, US, or reinforcer synonymously throughout the thesis) 
(Bouton, 2007). In instrumental conditioning, the relationship between behavior and 
reinforcement can be described by the law of effect, first described by Thorndike (Thorndike, 
1898). The law of effect states that the probability or frequency of a behavior is affected by if 
performing the behavior lead to the increased probability of a positive reinforcement or 
decreased probability of an aversive reinforcement. The law of effect is summarized in Table 
1. Here, it is assumed that a “Positive reinforcement” refers to an outcome with positive 
survival value (such as food or mating) and “Aversive reinforcement” refers to an outcome 
with negative survival value (such as pain or food toxicity). The consequence of this law is 
that animals generally will behave to maximize beneficial outcomes and minimize costly 
outcomes, in conceptual resemblance to how genetic evolution adapts organisms to their 
environment by enhancing beneficial traits and weeding out costly traits (as famously noted 
by Skinner, 1981). The studies included in this thesis exclusively focus on aversive 
reinforcement. Note that many stimuli can acquire reinforcing properties by pairing with 
primary reinforcers. Such secondary reinforcers are exceedingly important for human 
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behavior, as exemplified with money which functions as a powerful reinforcer in its own 
right. 
 
 
Effect of behavior Positive reinforcement Aversive reinforcement 
Produces reinforcement Reward ↑ Punishment ↓ 
Prevents reinforcement Omission ↓ Avoidance/escape ↑ 
Table 1. The law of effect. Arrows indicate whether behavior increases or decreases in 
frequency. After Bouton (2007) 
 
Classical conditioning similarly functions to adapt the animal to its environment (Domjan, 
2005). By learning that a stimulus predicts the occurrence of reinforcement, the animal can 
respond beforehand. Generally described, a stimulus predicting reinforcement (a CS), elicits 
responses related to the valence of the reinforcer, leading to approach of a CS predicting a 
positive reinforcement and avoidance of a CS predicting an aversive reinforcement. Such 
responses are called prepatory because they prepare the animal for interaction with the 
reinforcer (Bouton, 2007). Importantly, prepatory behaviors are not identical to those elicited 
by the reinforcer, and also are specific to different classes of reinforcers (Bouton, 2007; 
Dayan & Seymour, 2007). As shown in Table 2, classical conditioning shares the same 
mirror-pattern as instrumental conditioning; animals tend to approach stimuli predicting a 
reduction of aversive reinforcement and avoid stimuli predicting a reduction of positive 
reinforcement. Apart from the overt behavioral responses, the CS comes to elicit a host of 
bodily responses, such as physiological arousal or salivation. It is thought that the behavioral 
and physiological responses to the CS reflect a common central (i.e., brain) state, which often 
is identified with specific emotions. For example, classical conditioning with aversive 
reinforcement (typically electric shock) is termed fear conditioning. Fear conditioning evokes 
a constellation of responses including changes in blood pressure, skin conductance, heart rate 
and respiration that prepare the animal for defense, which can be summarized as fear (Ohman 
& Mineka, 2001). In humans, the state of fear also involves subjective negative feelings, but 
these are not necessarily considered to have a causal role or function for the physiological and 
behavioral indices (LeDoux, 2012). Several influential theories of emotion and motivation are 
based in the responses to, and in prediction of, various reinforcers (Rolls, 2000; Solomon, 
1980). For example, while predictions of aversive reinforcers can result in fear, omission of a 
predicted aversive reinforcer results in relief (Fujiwara, Tobler, Taira, Iijima, & Tsutsui, 
2009; Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2006; Solomon, 1980). 
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 Positive reinforcement Aversive reinforcement 
S predicts reinforcement Approach S Avoid S 
S predicts no 
reinforcement 
Avoid S Approach S 
Table 2. Response tendencies in classical conditioning. S = stimulus. After Bouton (2007) 
 
There are many important similarities between instrumental and classical conditioning. When 
a response (in instrumental conditioning) or a stimulus (in classical conditioning) stops being 
predictive of reinforcement, both learning processes exhibit extinction, in which the 
probability of a responses decreases, often gradually over time. Similarly, both processes are 
influenced by the magnitude of the reinforcer (higher magnitude typically generates stronger 
and faster acquisition of responding), as well as the timing of the reinforcer (subsequent to the 
response or the CS, and most efficient when presented in close temporal proximity). 
However, a range of both behavioral and neurological evidence indicates some degree of 
independence between instrumental and classical conditioning (Rescorla & Solomon, 1967). 
A CS, which has acquired predictive value through classical conditioning, can either enhance 
or suppress instrumental behavior if presented concurrently with the instrumental task. As 
predicted by combining Tables 1 and 2, the direction of the influence depend on the 
congruency with the instrumental action; an aversive CS suppresses instrumental behavior for 
positive reinforcers but enhances instrumental avoidance behaviors, while an positive CS 
enhances instrumental behavior motivated by positive reinforcers, and suppresses or corrupts 
instrumental avoidance behaviors (although not much research has been conducted regarding 
this last combination: Dayan & Seymour, 2007). This phenomenon is termed Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer (Bouton, 2007; Dayan & Seymour, 2007; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2008), and serves as the conceptual basis for Study II and III.  
Importantly, both instrumental (Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Morgan, Rendell, 
Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012) and classical associations (Olsson & Phelps, 2007) can be 
socially learned by observing the actions of others or by observing the reinforcements 
delivered to others. As mentioned above, social learning is highly functional as it mitigates 
the need for direct experiences to support learning (Boyd et al., 2011; Griffin, 2004; Olsson 
& Phelps, 2007; Rendell et al., 2010; Rendell, Fogarty, & Hoppitt, 2011). In humans, the 
most well-studied type of social learning, particularly in the aversive domain, is observational 
fear learning (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). In observational fear learning, a CS acquires fear-
invoking properties through its association with overt indices of a con-specific´s pain or 
discomfort. This suggests that the emotional behavior of others can function as reinforcers 
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(Olsson & Phelps, 2007). It is in principle possible that the reinforcing properties of others 
pain expressions reflects second-order conditioning (e.g., if others´ pain expressions reliably 
are paired with direct aversive experiences) (Dawson, Avarguès-Weber, Chittka, & 
Leadbeater, 2013), but studies involving non-human primates with controlled rearing 
conditions suggest that this probably is not the case (Cook & Mineka, 1990). Because most 
previous research has involved classical conditioning, it is unclear of humans learn avoidance 
behaviors from others. In Study IV, we sought to extend observational fear learning to 
instrumental behaviors, motivated by the central role threat of punishment is thought to play 
in human social behavior  (Bicchieri, 2005; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004). 
 
1.4 COMPUTATIONAL AND ALGORITHMIC MECHANISMS OF LEARNING 
The most classic and widely cited theory of classical conditioning is the Rescorla-Wagner (R-
W) model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) (which builds upon the earlier model by Bush & 
Monsteller: Glimcher, 2011). The R-W model was designed to explain the fundamental 
computational mechanisms involved in classical conditioning, and was able to account for a 
range of, at that time, puzzling phenomena (R. R. Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). The 
predictive (or associative) value (V) of the CS on trial t + 1 is given by the following 
equations: 
                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                               
where α (0 < α < 1) is a parameter (commonly referred to as the learning rate) which is 
determined by the salience of the CS, β (0 < β < 1) determines the salience of the reinforcer, 
and R is the reinforcement on trial t. The most important part is equation two (which 
commonly is referred to as the prediction error), which indicates how surprising the 
reinforcement was. When the CS perfectly predicts R, δ = 0. The term ∑V is the summed 
predictive value all stimuli presented on trial t. This summation is critical for the success of 
the R-W model as it allows explaining how compound stimuli affect learning, such as the 
blocking phenomenon (Rescorla, 1988). However, in many situations, the model can be 
simplified by just considering the specific CS presented on trial t. Furthermore, the β 
parameter is often removed to limit the number of free parameters in the model. This simple 
model can account for the effect of reinforcement magnitude (by the value of R), extinction 
after non-reinforcement, and that the CS must be predictive (i.e., the correlation between the 
CS and the reinforcer must be stronger than the correlation of no-CS with the reinforcer, 
Rescorla, 1988) of the reinforcement to produce learning. It is worth noting that the R-W 
model assumes the measured performance variable (e.g., skin conductance) to be linearly 
related to the predictive value. 
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In contrast to the algorithmic account of classical conditioning represented by the R-W 
model, the most famous models of instrumental conditioning aim to describe equilibrium 
behavior across an experimental session. The impetus for these models was discovery of the 
probability matching phenomenon (Herrnstein, 1970), which entail that animals on average 
do not maximize reception of reward when choosing between two options  (i.e., concurrent 
schedules of reinforcement), but rather perform each action in proportion to the amount of 
reward received by the action. This relationship, termed the matching law, can in its simplest 
form be summarized as 
  
    
 
  
  
                                                                                                                                                              
where B1 is the frequency of the first action, B2 the frequency of the second action, and R1 and 
R2 the corresponding frequencies of reinforcement. This empirical relationship has motivated 
a very large literature because probability matching is sub-optimal; the optimal strategy 
would be to maximize performance of the action with the highest average reward. It has for 
example been suggested that probability matching emerge because animals seek to maximize 
the momentary rate of reinforcement (Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, & Vaughan, 1993). It 
is however clear that many behavioral strategies can result in matching (Houston & 
McNamara, 1981). The matching phenomenon is outside the scope of this thesis, but it can be 
noted for completeness that average behavior in Study II and III, which most closely 
resembles concurrent schedules of reinforcement, was consistent with probability matching. 
1.5 FROM LEARNING TO VALUE-BASED DECISION MAKING 
On a very general level of description, the function of learning is to sub-serve value-based 
decision making (Gintis, 2007). Value-based decision making takes places whenever animals 
choose between different actions based on estimates of their value, from foraging to financial 
decisions (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Such estimates can be influenced by 
experience through individual learning, by observing the actions of others through social 
learning as well as by evolutionary predispositions tied to specific stimuli or actions. All 
studies included in this thesis can be viewed as involving value-based decision making in the 
aversive domain. In recent years, the understanding of the mechanisms underlying value-
based decision making has made great progress, and an integrative framework has been 
proposed: value-based decision making require the joint operation of a number of 
computational mechanisms; representation of the feasible actions, internal states, and 
external states, valuation of each action given the internal and external states, action selection 
based on these valuations, outcome evaluation of the outcomes and states that followed the 
action, and learning, by which the representations and valuations are updated based on the 
outcomes (Rangel et al., 2008).  Naturally, the current knowledge about these mechanisms 
differs. Ideally, each mechanisms, and how they interact, should be described on all three of 
Marr´s levels, but for most of these mechanisms, the current state of knowledge is far from 
ideal. For the representation process, almost nothing is currently known. In the studies 
included in this thesis, representation is assumed to accurately correspond to the stimuli 
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presented and actions possible in the experimental task.  Much more is known about the 
valuation process, which is of particular importance for Study II and III wherefore a brief 
summary of the computational and implementation mechanisms of valuation is presented 
below.  
On the basis of a sizable body of human and animal behavioral evidence, the existence of 
three different types of valuation systems has been postulated (Dayan, 2009; Dayan & Niv, 
2008; Rangel et al., 2008). However, the exact number of systems, and how independent they 
are from each other, is currently unknown. The three types of systems should be viewed as an 
operational division of the valuation processes according to the different types of 
computations that are known to be involved (Rangel et al., 2008). These systems partially 
mirror the different types of learning, instrumental and classical (Pavlovian) conditioning, 
which were described above. The Pavlovian systems assign value to a small set of behaviors 
in response to stimuli with intrinsic or acquired evolutionary significance, as when paired 
with an evolutionary valuable reinforcer (Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006). As described 
in Table 2, these Pavlovian responses are organized along an approach-avoidance dimension 
and serve to optimize the interactions of the animal with its environment. The limited 
behavioral repertoire of the Pavlovian system is it´s hallmark relative to the instrumental 
systems. Importantly, the expression of Pavlovian behaviors are not automatic; the fact that 
Pavlovian responses can be interrupted by other brain systems (as when humans override the 
Pavlovian impulse to overeat in the presence of food) indicate that they must be assigned a 
value which competes with other possible actions (Dayan et al., 2006; Rangel et al., 2008). 
As noted above, such competitive interactions between Pavlovian responses and instrumental 
responding are expressed in the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer phenomena. The Pavlovian 
responses can thus  be viewed as a set of action priors over which the instrumental systems 
operate (Seymour & Dolan, 2008). On the level of functional neurobiology, the Pavlovian 
system involves sub-cortical brain structures such as the amygdala and periaquductal grey 
(LeDoux, 2012; Seymour & Dolan, 2008). Furthermore, Pavlovian responses to certain, so 
called evolutionary prepared, stimuli appear to underlie important learning biases in humans 
and other primates. Stimuli such as snakes or threatening con-specific faces exhibit enhanced 
fear conditioning when paired with an aversive reinforcer relative to control stimuli, which 
have been explained as due to the evolutionary history of these stimuli (Ohman, 2009; 
Ohman & Mineka, 2001). The preparedness phenomena is thought to underlie the uneven 
distribution of human fears and phobias, where for example snakes are common objects of 
phobias relative to cars or electric outlets which likely are more common dangers in the 
modern world (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). The influence of the intrinsic value of prepared 
stimuli on value-based decision making is explored in Study III. Aside from the Pavlovian 
valuation system, current evidence indicates the existence of at least two instrumental 
valuation systems; the habitual system and the goal-directed system. As implied by the name, 
these systems underlie instrumental conditioning, and can flexibly map arbitrary responses to 
desired outcomes. The distinction between the instrumental systems are not of primary 
importance for this thesis, but is briefly summarized for completeness. It is generally thought 
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that the goal-directed system, which involves a “cognitive map” of the relationship between 
actions and outcomes, is recruited when confronted with novel situations, and the habitual 
system, which involves simpler stimulus-response associations, successively assumes control 
during the course of training (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Behaviorally, these systems can be 
dissociated by manipulations of the value of an outcome (e.g., water), for example by 
allowing the animal to satisfy its need for it (by drinking to satiety; reinforcer devaluation). 
Because the goal-directed system involves a representation of the identity of the outcome, 
such devaluations will directly lead to reduced responding. In contrast, the habitual system, 
which is believed to only keep a “cached” one-dimensional (scalar) representation of the 
value of the action, is insensitive to the devaluations; the animal will perform as if still thirsty, 
until the reinforce is consumed in the new devalued state. Neurally, the goal-directed system 
appears to mainly involve parts of the pre-frontal cortex (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). In contrast, 
the habitual system mainly involves the striatum (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Both systems are 
important for adaptive behavior, but the precise computational mechanisms governing their 
interaction are an area of active research (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). 
 In comparison to the relatively well-characterized valuation process, little is known about the 
mechanisms of action selection. It is clear that the estimates by the different valuation 
systems must be compared and possibly integrated in some way to produce adaptive 
behavior. The most sophisticated proposal of this comparison process pertains to goal-
directed versus habitual instrumental control. Daw and colleagues (Daw et al., 2005) 
suggested that these systems compete for behavioral control, and that the contribution of each 
system to action selection is weighted by the uncertainty of their respective value estimates, 
thus producing optimal control. The notion of competition between valuation systems for 
action selection have also been extended to the Pavlovian system, which is viewed as a 
hardwired influence on action selection which can either enhance or corrupt instrumental 
behavior depending on the correspondence between the Pavlovian responses and optimal 
action (Dayan et al., 2006). In Study III, we suggest that stimuli with intrinsic (e.g., 
prepared) negative value influences value-based decision making as predicted by a 
computational model where the Pavlovian and the instrumental systems compete for action 
selection at the time of choice. In many models of value-based decision making, the action 
selection stage is implemented with a logistic function known as Softmax (Daw, 2011): 
       
        
             
                [4] 
Here, QA refer to the expected value of choosing action A on trial t + 1. As seen, the 
probability of choosing action A is determined by the ratio of the expected value of A and the 
sum of all possible actions, scaled by the parameter β (not to be confused with the β 
parameter in the R-W model). The parameter β is commonly referred to as the exploration vs. 
exploitation parameter. Higher values of β increase the probability of choosing another action 
than the one with the highest expected value, which can be beneficial for ensuring continued 
exploration of the action space (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The Softmax function describes 
human decision making well (Daw, 2011; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 
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2006), although alternative decision functions are possible (e.g., ε-greedy). If Qi is interpreted 
as the valuation of the instrumental system, it is clear that other terms can added within the 
Softmax function to represent competition between valuation systems (e.g., Huys et al., 
2011). This approached is used in Study III to model competition between the Pavlovian and 
instrumental systems. 
As for action selection, little is known about outcome evaluation. Human fMRI studies have 
identified the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as a nexus for value related signals (Hare & 
O’Doherty, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Plassmann, 2010; Rangel et al., 2008) . 
Such signals generally correlate with subjective reports about the quality of the experience, 
across modalities. Furthermore, such responses can also be identified for secondary 
reinforcers, such as money. Thus, the OFC appears to represent valuation of outcomes as a 
common currency.  
Finally, the learning process has been focus of intense attention within psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience under the guise of reinforcement learning (RL). Reinforcement 
learning was originally formulated to solve adaptive control problems within the field of 
artificial intelligence, but the inspiration mainly came from animal learning theory (Glimcher, 
2011). A simple formulation of a RL model (Q-learning) is described below:  
                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                         
As above, Qi refer to the expected value of choosing action i on trial t + 1. As seen, this 
formulation is identical to the R-W model, but the Q-values represent estimates of expected 
value instead of predictive value/associative strength as in the original R-W formulation 
(Glimcher, 2011). Combined with the Softmax function (equation 4), equations 5-6 
constitutes a simple model of value-based decision making. Variations of this model 
(equation 4-6) are used in Study II-IV to model human behavior. However, much of the 
enthusiasm for RL within psychology and cognitive neuroscience can be traced to the finding 
that the mammalian brain appears to actually compute prediction errors during the course of 
learning. The implementational mechanisms sub-serving RL are briefly reviewed below. 
 
1.6 IMPLEMENTATIONAL MECHANISMS OF LEARNING AND DECISION MAKING 
The best understood aspect of learning concern how the habitual system learns by trial and 
error in a manner resembling the R-W model. The basic idea is that a prediction error signal 
is computed by comparing the actual outcome of an action or state with its predicted outcome 
(equation 2). Such prediction error signals have been identified in the mammal brain, 
originally using single cell recordings in the dopaminergic midbrain of macaques during 
reward learning (Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001) and later using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans (Seymour et al., 2004). Recently, causal manipulations 
have also been conducted in behaving rodents using optogenetic methods, thus showing that 
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dopaminergic prediction errors have a casual role in learning (Steinberg et al., 2013). Activity 
in dopaminergic neurons during learning shows a pattern resembling how reinforcements 
affect behavior (Table 1). An unexpected positive reinforcement leads to increased phasic 
firing in these neurons, while the omission of an expected positive reinforcement leads to 
reduced firing (Tobler, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2003). As expected from a prediction error 
account, fully expected positive outcomes do not induce increased firing, showing that these 
neurons code for prediction errors rather than for the sensory aspects of reward. For aversive 
reinforcements, the picture is less clear. Aversive outcomes generally result in decreased 
firing rates, but due to the low baseline firing rates of midbrain dopaminergic neurons, it has 
been argued that the possible range of this reduction is too limited for coding a range of 
aversive outcomes with any resolution (Dayan & Niv, 2008). Rather, it has been proposed 
that some other neural system, possibly involving serotonin, contributes to positive aversive 
prediction errors (i.e., prediction errors where an unexpected aversive outcome results in 
increased firing rates), although this is presently unclear (Boureau & Dayan, 2011; Dayan & 
Huys, 2009). Thus, the extensive evidence in support of reward prediction errors in the 
dopaminergic midbrain do not speak directly to the studies included this thesis, which 
exclusively focuses on the aversive domain. However, the evidence do show that the RL 
framework is realistic, which makes a generalization to the aversive domain plausible 
(Delgado, Li, Schiller, & Phelps, 2008; McNally, Johansen, & Blair, 2011). For example, 
aversive prediction errors have been shown in the mice amygdala (McHugh et al., 2014) and 
in the human striatum (Delgado et al., 2008), although the generating sources of these signals 
are still unknown. 
It should be noted that the dopaminergic reward prediction errors do not correspond to those 
computed by the simple R-W model, but rather the slightly more complicated temporal 
difference model (Glimcher, 2011; Waelti et al., 2001). The temporal difference model of RL 
was developed to solve problems of how autonomous agents should adapt their behavior to 
the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The temporal difference model is basically a 
continuous time- extension of the basic R-W model, where prediction errors and updated 
expected value estimates are computed on every time-step (rather than once per experimental 
episode). Importantly, the expected value of performing an action in response to a stimulus or 
in a particular state depends not only on the outcomes (if any) on that precise time step, but 
also on the discounted value of all expected future outcomes (which can depend on the 
chosen action in that state). Temporal difference RL allows a solution to the temporal credit 
assignment problem, which refer to the fact that if rewards are delayed it is difficult to 
correctly determine the action or stimulus that predicted the reward. The solution is 
accomplished by attributing each obtained reward not only to the current time-step but also a 
few of the preceding moments (Glimcher, 2011). Dopaminergic neurons apparently reflect 
this process in the propagation of phasic activity from the delivery of an unexpected reward 
to the stimulus that predicted it over the course of experimental trials (Waelti et al., 2001). 
Reinforcement learning prediction errors in the dopaminergic midbrain are also widely 
believed to underlie neural activity in the human anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in response 
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to outcomes, particularly response errors, which are worse than expected (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002, but see Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 2014). This activity, as measured using 
electroencephalography (EEG) in humans, is known as the error related negativity (ERN; 
Hajcak, 2012). Importantly, the ERN is amplified as a function of the severity of the 
consequences of errors, such as monetary punishment  (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 
2005), social evaluation (Hajcak et al., 2005), and punishment with an aversive noise (Riesel, 
Weinberg, Endrass, Kathmann, & Hajcak, 2012), in concordance with enlarged aversive 
outcomes, and thus larger negative prediction errors. Based on such findings, researchers 
have proposed that the ERN might index “affective” qualities of error monitoring (Hajcak, 
2012) in addition to the traditional emphasis on cognitive control (Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993).  A recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies showed extensive 
overlapping activation to cognitive control, negative emotion and pain in the anterior mid 
cingulate cortex (aMCC) (Shackman et al., 2011). It was postulated that this regions 
integrates information about negative reinforcers (e.g., pain) arriving from cortical and 
subcortical afferents (e.g., insula, striatum, amygdala), to bias behavioral selection away from 
punishment. The bias of behavioral selection would foremost needed in demanding or 
potentially costly situations, for example, when the consequences of action are uncertain 
(e.g., probabilistic learning), multiple conflicting response alternatives are active, or when 
failure of an intended action is associated with potential punishment (Shackman et al., 2011). 
This hypothesis is of particular relevance for Study I.  
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2 AIMS 
 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate how aversive learning shapes adaptive 
behavior in the social domain. To this end, the following objectives were specified: 
 To investigate how threat of punishment affects action selection, and to evaluate 
corrugator EMG as a novel index of the control processes active under threat of 
punishment (Study I) 
 
 To assess how facial expression function as reinforcers in social avoidance 
learning, and to understand how individual differences in negative racial bias 
modulates the effect of social reinforcers (Study II) 
 
 To understand how the intrinsic negative value of “preparded” social and non-
social stimuli affects avoidance learning (Study III) 
 
 To investigate how threat of punishment can generate and propagate avoidance 
behaviors between individuals through social learning (Study IV) 
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES 
3.1 STUDY 1 
Background and objectives 
Cognitive control over action selection has received extensive attention over the last three to 
four decades, and much is known both about the psychological and neural mechanisms 
involved (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
However, this vast body of research has generally disregarded how the consequences of 
failed control affect behavior, which surprising when viewed from a functional perspective: 
control is most needed when control failure is costly. Such costly consequences might take 
place both in the non-social (e.g., failing to override a habitual tendency to look to the right 
when crossing the street in Britain) and the social (e.g., failing to control verbal behavior in a 
hostile interaction) domains. In this study, we investigated how cognitive control over action 
selection was influenced by threat of punishment and response conflict in a simple 
experimental model designed to capture situations where failure to respond correctly is 
costly. As described in the introduction, the ACC integrates signals related to danger and 
control demands, with the hypothetical function of promoting adaptive behavior (the 
Adaptive Control Theory, Shackman et al., 2011). We investigated if activity in the 
corrugator supercilii muscle of the upper face would potentially index the computations of the 
ACC. The rational for this hypothesis was the known electro-physiological correlate of ACC 
activity following response errors (i.e., control failure) and response conflict, the ERN, which 
also is responsive to aversive stimuli. The ACC enervates the corrugator supercilii muscle 
(Morecraft, Louie, Herrick, & Stilwell-Morecraft, 2001; Shackman et al., 2011), which 
motivated us to look for functional similarities between activity in this muscle and the ERN. 
We hoped that activity in this muscle could function as an index of the implementational 
level mechanisms involved in action selection during threat of punishment, and thus shed 
light on the underlying process. We predicted that (i) behavioral performance should be 
enhanced by punishment threat, and (ii) cEMG activity should be sensitive to the 
combination of response conflict, punishment threat, and error commissions.  
Methods 
Forty participants took part in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
Punishment Risk group (n = 22, 11 male), and the Control group (n = 18, 10 male). Four 
participants were excluded from the Control group, as they faultily reported a relationship 
between their performance and the number of received electric shocks (see below for details). 
The participants performed a two-choice speeded gender decision task (is the individual 
displayed male or female), and responded behaviorally with a keyboard. The probability of 
each target gender was asymmetric (75% male faces/25% female faces, or the reverse), 
giving a correspondingly asymmetric response ratio. This manipulation was based on the 
Go/No-Go task (Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008), where the high probability target 
induces a pre-potent tendency to respond, which has to be inhibited for low probability 
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targets. However, the standard Go/No-Go task has apparent limitations due to the lack of a 
recorded response for the critical low probability (no-go) condition. For this reason, 
responses to both targets were collected. It should be noted that evidence from fMRI (Kenner 
et al., 2010; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008) and computational modeling (Gomez, Ratcliff, 
& Perea, 2007) indicate that response inhibition and response selection is highly related, or 
even overlapping, processes, suggesting that the task used in the present study and the 
standard Go/No-Go task are comparable. The 75% target condition is referred to as Low 
Conflict and the 25% target condition is referred to as High Conflict. The Low Conflict and 
High Conflict gender was counterbalanced across participants.  
Punishment threat (referred to as Punishment risk in the article, and below) was manipulated 
block-wise, with three levels; No Risk, Low Risk, and High Risk. For Low- and High Risk 
blocks, participants were instructed that any errors (both commissions and omissions) during 
the block might be punished with a mild electric shock after the block. Critically, the actual 
number of delivered shocks was identical for all participants. The intention was to manipulate 
punishment risk without introducing performance-contingent variability in the amount of 
experienced shocks across participants. Participants received 0-2 electric shocks after Low 
Risk blocks, and 2-4 electric shocks after High Risk blocks. Thus, no actual relationship 
between individual performance and number of shocks existed. Importantly, funneled 
interviews after the experiment showed that all 22 participants in the Punishment Risk group 
believed that there was a direct relation between their own performance and the number of 
shocks they received.  
 As noted above, 14 participants were randomly assigned to the Control group. The Control 
group performed the same experimental task and received the same number of electric shocks 
as the Punishment Risk group, but was explicitly informed that there was no contingency 
between performance and punishment. The purpose of this manipulation was to delimitate the 
effect of punishment threat on corrugator activity from general shock anxiety. Four 
participants in the control group faultily reported a relationship between their performance 
and the number of shocks they received, and were therefore excluded from the analyses. 
Both groups completed 12 blocks (4 blocks per Punishment Risk level) of 80 trials (total of 
960 trials). Both block order (Punishment Risk) and trial order (Response Conflict) were fully 
randomized for each participant. A colored frame surrounding the target stimulus indicated 
Punishment Risk level (control group: ordinal amount of expected shocks) during the blocks 
(No Risk = green, Low Risk = yellow, High Risk = red).  
Electromyographic (cEMG) activity of the left corrugator supercilii muscle was recorded 
using a BioPac (MP100; Biopac Systems Inc, www.biopac.com) device equipped with two 
miniature Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with electrolyte gel (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). A 
third ground electrode was placed on the mid forehead, proximal to the hairline. The raw 
EMG signal (sample rate 1000 Hz) was amplified and filtered through a 28–500 Hz IIR band 
pass, followed by a 50 Hz IIR band stop. The signal was rectified and integrated with a time 
constant of 20 ms. 
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The cEMG data was extracted in 100 ms time bins locked to the behavioral response on each 
trial using in-house software. Time-bins were extracted both prior (Pre) and following (Post) 
the behavioral response. The number of  Pre-response relative to Post-response time-bins 
extracted on each trial was dependent on RT (e.g., for a trial with relatively long RT, more 
Pre-response time-bins and fewer Post-response time-bins were extracted, compared to a 
short RT trial). A 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline (mean cEMG amplitude) was subtracted from 
all time-bins to reduce slow signal drift and tonic level differences. Baseline measures below 
or exceeding 3 standard deviations were replaced and interpolated as an un-weighted average 
from the six adjacent baseline means. The peak cEMG amplitude was computed for each 
time-bin. 
 
Results & Conclusion 
First, as predicted from a functional perspective, the results showed that the perceived risk of 
punishment for error commissions attenuated the detrimental effect of high response conflict 
on performance. This effect was however non-linear: Low Risk enhanced performance, while 
High Risk had little effect (Figure 1). Second, the cEMG was highly sensitive to both 
punishment risk and response conflict, showing the predicted properties of a signal that 
integrates cognitive control demands and avoidance motivation.  
 
Figure 1. Study 1. Performance accuracy as a function of punishment risk and conflict. 
In particular, the study provided the first report of cEMG activity as a correlate of error 
monitoring (Figure 2), and showed that this correlate (i) operates on a similar time-scale as 
the ACiC generated index of error processing, the ERN, (ii) is modulated by the expected 
  27 
aversive consequences of errors, and (iii) related to behavioral adjustments following errors 
(post-error slowing).  
 
Figure 2. Study I. Corrugator EMG activity within 100 milliseconds following Correct and 
Error responses for the different levels of punishment risk. 
These finding stresses the importance of considering not only the goals of behavior, but also 
the potentially aversive or costly consequences of failure, to fully characterize cognitive 
control over action selection. We also for the first time demonstrated that cEMG is sensitive 
to the interaction of cognitive control and punishment avoidance. This finding is concordant 
with the proposed integrative role of the ACC in potentially dangerous and control 
demanding situations (Shackman et al., 2011), and suggest that further investigation of the 
response properties of the cEMG might be highly fruitful for understanding the 
implementational processes underlying action selection, reinforcement learning and cognitive 
control in the aversive domain. 
 
3.2 STUDY 2 
Background and objectives 
Reinforcement learning is likely to play an important role in adaptive social behavior, by 
allowing one´s behaviors toward others to be based on the emotional significance of their 
previous actions toward oneself (Ruff & Fehr, 2014). Facial expressions is a class of 
reinforcers that might play an important role in such social RL by signaling benign and 
malign behavioral intentions (Blair, 2003; Heerey, 2013). The face also conveys information 
about an individual’s racial and ethnic group belonging, and such markers of social group 
membership might affect learning from social reinforcement.  In support of this conjecture, 
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previous research has shown superior memory for angry, relative to neutral or happy, racial 
out-group faces (Ackerman et al., 2006), and more persistent fear conditioning to racial out-
group versus in-group faces (Navarrete et al., 2009; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005).  
It is however unknown whether the group-membership (race) of a face can modulate the 
value of its emotional expression, and thus shape behavior during social interaction. Related 
to this, little is known about the possible mechanisms underlying the impact if social 
reinforcement on behavior. To address these issues, we examined how racial bias shaped 
avoidance behavior reinforced by threatening (angry) and friendly (happy) facial expressions 
posed by racial in- or out-group individuals, which is analogous to how our behavior is 
shaped as a function of the facial feedback we receive from others in response to our actions 
(Blair, 2003). We used a novel experimental model of a dynamic social situation in which 
facial race and emotion reinforce behavior to elucidate (1) how individual differences in 
racial bias modulate social RL from facial expressions posed by racial in- or out-group 
members, and (2) the underlying computational mechanisms, and how these are shaped by 
racial bias, by computational modeling. First, we reasoned that because angry out-group faces 
(Black for the White experimental group) were potentially perceived as more threatening than 
angry in-group and happy out-group faces, learning to avoid them should be easier. 
Importantly, we predicted that this learning bias would be directly related to individual 
differences in racial bias. Second, we aimed to understand not only if, but also how, social 
reinforcers (here emotional expressions) and racial belonging together would affect RL by 
elucidating the underlying computations. As described in the introduction, value-based 
decision making can be parsed into a number of separate sub-processes, where two of the 
most important are outcome evaluation (OE; what was the positive or negative value of the 
outcome?) and outcome learning (OL; how fast, i.e., at what rate, does an unexpected 
outcome affect subsequent behavior?) (Rangel et al., 2008).  We sought to determine which 
of these processes were most sensitive to the emotional expression and racial belonging of the 
reinforcing faces. 
 
Methods 
Thirty participants of European decent (20 women) performed a probabilistic two-choice 
learning task. They were instructed (by a 1 s text message prior to each of the 16 blocks of the 
experiment) to choose the one out of two abstract fractal stimuli that lead to least exposure 
(“avoid”) of the emotional face (angry or happy depending on block). The rational for 
contrasting angry and happy faces was to assess the specificity of the predicted interaction of 
racial bias, emotion and race. Each fractal differed in terms of the probability that it was 
followed by an emotional face (P = .3, the instrumentally optimal choice, or P = 0.7, the 
instrumentally sub-optimal choice). The presentation of the neutral or emotional face, 
subsequent to the participant’s choice, served as the only feedback on the choice made. By 
repeatedly choosing among these two fractals, the participants learned across trials which 
choice was optimal in each block. No instructions regarding the racial group belonging of the 
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stimuli were provided. The stimuli gender was randomized for each block of the 12 
experimental blocks (four block for each experimental condition), each consisting of 30 trials. 
Because the racial group of the facial stimuli was irrelevant to the instructed goal of the task, 
this design allowed us to probe the indirect effects of emotion and race in interaction on 
instrumental learning. Following the experiment, the participants completed a validated 
Swedish version of the Modern Racism Scale to assess explicit negative attitudes toward non- 
European immigrants in Sweden (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000), and the Race 
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) to measure implicit racial bias. 
 
Results & Conclusion 
Individual differences in explicit racial bias strongly, and uniquely, modulated the impact of 
out-group faces on behavior, so that the higher the explicit racial bias, the better learned 
avoidance of threatening out-group individuals. Previous findings have shown more 
persistent fear conditioning to racial out-group, relative to racial in-group faces (Navarrete et 
al., 2009; Olsson et al., 2005), and to angry, compared to neutral, in-group faces (Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001). The present results provide an important extension of previous research by 
showing that reinforcing facial expressions and markers of racial group-belonging interact in 
their impact on instrumental learning as a function of individual differences in racial bias (see 
Figure 3). 
 
 30 
 
Figure 3. Study II. The probability of optimal avoidance when out-group faces served as 
reinforcers as a function of their emotional expressions and individual differences in racial 
bias. 
 
By applying a RL model-based analysis, we distinguished between two competing 
hypotheses about the computational processes underlying social avoidance learning; OE and 
OL (Lin, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2011; Rangel et al., 2008). The model comparison provided 
strong support for the OL-hypothesis. We found that social reinforcement and racial group-
belonging together affected how rapidly unexpected outcomes were transformed into future 
behaviors. Importantly, individual differences in both explicit and implicit racial bias were 
positively and selectively correlated with the learning rate associated with threatening racial 
out-group faces. These correlations indicate that individuals with higher, as compared to 
lower, racial bias more rapidly update the value of each action to adjust their subsequent 
behavior when exposed to threatening racial out-group faces. This rapid value updating was 
functional; individuals with high explicit racial bias exhibited enhanced performance when 
their actions were reinforced by threatening out-group faces. Taken together, these results 
suggest a computational mechanism for how racial bias affects social reinforcement, 
dependent on the racial belonging of the reinforcing individual. These findings have 
implications for understanding the role of learning in social interaction, and how this learning 
is modulated by the racial group belonging of the people that interact. 
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3.3 STUDY 3 
Background and objectives 
Humans and non-human primates preferentially acquire conditioned fear to certain 
archetypical, “prepared” threatening stimuli (referred to as Pavlovian triggers in Study III), 
several of which are highly important for the social domain (i.e., threatening faces and out-
group faces). Yet, how these learning biases influence voluntary behavior, their basic 
mechanistic underpinnings, and how they interact with learning experiences during the life 
span of the individual remain unknown. In Study III, we investigated how four classes of 
such stimuli that previously have been shown to be preferentially associated with fear 
(snakes, threatening in-group faces, racial out-group faces, and guns) influenced voluntary 
behavior.  We investigated the behavioral consequences of these stimuli on behavior using a 
novel experimental model and computational analyses. Furthermore, we sought to 
characterize the computational mechanisms through which stimulus driven biases interact 
with learning experiences using RL modeling. We also aimed to clarify how the negative 
value associated with the Pavlovian triggers was acquired by conducting two independent 
ratings studies. These rating studies probed the degree of negative individual and social 
exposure the participants had with the different Pavlovian triggers. 
 
Methods 
Experiment 1 (snake vs. flower stimuli) included 32 (21 female) participants, Experiment 2 
(angry face vs. happy face stimuli) included 42 (22 female) participants, Experiment 3 (out-
group face vs. in-group face stimuli) included 48 (34 female) participants, and Experiment 4 
(gun vs. flower stimuli) included 34 (18 female) participants. No participant took part in more 
than one experiment. The first ratings sample involved 59 (39 female) participants, and the 
second ratings sample 35 (26 female) participants. All four experiments had identical 
experimental design, and only differed in the stimuli selection. The experimental task was a 
two-choice decision task with probabilistic aversive reinforcement (electric shocks). The 
participants were instructed to try to learn to avoid shocks, and that one choice stimulus 
might be better than the other for doing so. The task had a mixed two-by-two design, with 
one between-participants factor (Pavlovian Compatibility: Compatible To 
Incompatible/Incompatible to Compatible) and one within-participants factor (Phase: 
First/Second). After half the experiment (35 trials) the choice – reinforcement contingency 
reversed. For the Compatible To Incompatible - groups, choosing the Pavlovian trigger was 
the sub-optimal instrumental action (P(Shock) = .7)  in the First half and optimal (P(Shock) = 
.3)  in the Second half, while the reverse was true for the Incompatible to Compatible - 
groups. This design allowed us to control for the order effect of presentation, and disentangle 
transient and sustained effects of Pavlovian triggers on instrumental learning. The 
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participants were not informed about the contingency reversal. The participants performed 6 
practice trials (no reinforcement), followed by the experimental session (70 trials). 
Participants used the left and right arrow keys on a computer keyboard to indicate their 
choices. The location of the choice stimuli varied randomly between the left and right 
position across trials to prevent spatial selection strategies.  
We conducted two rating studies with independent samples of participants, who rated the 
stimuli used in Exp. 1-4. In the first rating study, the dimensions were “Threat” and 
“Danger”, rated on a 7 – graded scale, and anchored with “Not at all”(1) and “Very”(7) . The 
participants also reported how many individual negative experiences they had experienced in 
relation to what the images depicted, using a three-graded scale consisting of “None”, “Few”, 
and “Many”. In the second ratings study, we asked the participants to estimate how much 
negatively valenced exposure they had experienced to the different Pavlovian triggers 
through (i) individual experience, (ii) family and friends, (iii) news media, and (iv) popular 
culture.   
   
Results & Conclusion 
Collectively, our findings showed that the intrinsic value of stimuli predicting danger, 
Pavlovian triggers, has a strong influence on voluntary behavior. More specifically, the 
influence of Pavlovian triggers took the form of a stimulus-driven bias that either enhanced or 
corrupted voluntary behavior depending on the compatibility with the optimal instrumental 
action. This pattern was consistent across all four types of Pavlovian triggers; snakes, guns, 
threatening faces and out-group faces, showing that both archetypically phylogenetic (e.g., 
snakes) and ontogentic (e.g., guns) stimuli can affect voluntary behavior (Figure 4). For out-
group faces (Exp. 3) the pattern was qualified by the fact that only participants with above 
average explicit racial bias exhibited this stimulus-driven bias. 
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Figure 4. Study III. Probability of optimal behavior for the four classes of Pavlovian 
triggers: (A) Snakes (interaction: p < .01), (B) Threatening faces (interaction: p < .01), and 
(C) Out-group faces for participants high in racial bias (interaction: p < .05), (D) Guns 
(interaction: p <.01). Black bars = Compatible to Incompatible, grey bars = Incompatible to 
Compatible.  Error bars denote SEM. 
 
Our analyses of the computational basis of the Pavlovian influence on instrumental behavior 
provide support for a simple proposal: the intrinsic value of Pavlovian triggers primarily 
affect the action selection, rather than the updating or learning, process. In the independent 
systems - model, which provided the most parsimonious account of the data, the Pavlovian 
value down-weighted the instrumentally learned value of the action represented by the 
Pavlovian trigger at the time of choice, resulting in avoidance. The Pavlovian valuation 
process appears to be learning-independent (within the time-scale of the experiment) and 
automatically triggered, as shown by the shift in the direction of the Pavlovian bias after the 
contingency reversal in our experiments (see Figure 4).  The fact that guns were associated 
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with a Pavlovian value, as estimated in the RL model, comparable to snakes and higher than 
both out-group and threatening faces clearly demonstrate that evolutionary predispositions 
are not necessary for the results of Study III. Instead, the pattern of estimated Pavlovian 
value of the stimuli types matched their perceived dangerousness, as rated by an independent 
sample. Perceived dangerousness or deadliness has been suggested as the factor underlying 
both phylogenetic and ontogenetic fear-relevant stimuli, thought to result in fear learning 
biases through an enhanced expectancy for associated negative events (Davey, 1992, 1995). 
A classical account of the etiology of human fears suggested that multiple pathways jointly 
contribute to the acquisition of fears (Rachman, 1977). These pathways are direct experience, 
observation (or vicarious) and verbal transmission of threat information. The effectiveness of 
the last two pathways, about which the preparedness literature generally has been silent, has 
been repentantly demonstrated in both children and adults (Askew & Field, 2008; Olsson & 
Phelps, 2007; Phelps et al., 2001). Our second ratings study, where we asked participants to 
estimate the amount of negatively valenced exposure from different sources to the four types 
of Pavlovian triggers, provide qualitative support for the idea that the Pavlovian value of all 
types except threatening faces is, at least partially, acquired socially, through observational 
and/or verbal pathways. 
 
3.4 STUDY 4 
Background and objectives 
The results of Study III suggested that socially acquired negative valuations can powerfully 
impact individual avoidance learning and decision making. It´s long been recognized in 
behavioral ecology that animals are prone to influence the behavior of each other, especially 
if the environment is dangerous (Rendell et al., 2011; Webster & Laland, 2008). This is an 
adaptive strategy: social learning allows avoiding the costs associated with individual 
learning when the environment is dangerous, for example through threat of predation 
(Griffin, 2004). A limited research literature has shown that humans can acquire conditioned 
fear responses through observing how another individual (the Demonstrator) is exposed to 
aversive reinforcement (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). However, very little is known about how 
actual (instrumental) avoidance behaviors are transmitted socially in humans. In Study IV, 
we aimed to extend the understanding of human social learning about aversive outcomes by 
directly exploring how social information can influence avoidance behaviors. As outlined in 
the introduction, many uniquely human behavioral patterns, such as social norms and taboos, 
are maintained through the threat of punishment. Collectively, such large scale behavioral 
patterns involving threat of punishment can be described as “avoidance traditions”. In 
humans, many avoidance traditions are likely to be adaptive, such as cooperative norms 
maintained by threat of punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) and taboos prohibiting 
dangerous food (Henrich & Henrich, 2010). Other avoidance traditions are arbitrary or even 
destructive (Aunger, 1994; Mani, 1987), such as when behaviors that were adaptive in the 
past has become maladaptive in modern societies (Boyd et al., 2011). We addressed a little 
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studied, but crucial aspect for understanding how punishment shapes avoidance traditions: the 
motivational influence of punishment on the punishee, and how this influence can support the 
emergence, maintenance, and transmission of avoidance traditions. Despite the large 
theoretical and empirical literature investigating the influence of punishment on cooperation 
and other behavioral traditions, surprisingly little is known about the psychological and 
computational mechanisms of learning and decision-making underpinning this influence. We 
hypothesized that the rewarding effect of avoiding a possible punishment (see Table 1) 
together with a tendency to copy the behavior of others can provide building blocks to help 
explain the emergence, maintenance and transmission of avoidance traditions. Their joint 
impact on behavior would thereby present an important complement to established game 
theoretic analyses of how rare punishment affects large scale behavior patterns. To address 
our hypothesis, we first developed an agent-based simulation model that mimicked the core 
features of avoidance traditions that we discuss above: (i) one´s actions risk being punished, 
(ii) others’ actions can be observed, and (iii) there is an uncertainty about the optimal course 
of action. Agent-based simulations is a computational modeling framework commonly used 
within biology and social sciences such as economy, but which yet has to receive much 
attention within psychology (Smith & Conrey, 2007). The premise of agent-based 
simulations is that complex systems can be understood and explained as emergent 
phenomena generated by the interaction of many simple individual agents. We used this 
modeling technique to investigate if the combination of rewarding punishment omission and 
behavior copying can in principle generate, maintain and transmit inter-generational 
avoidance traditions. We then confirmed the assumptions underlying this model in four 
separate experiments that each addressed specific aspects of the agent-based simulation 
model. 
Methods 
The agent-based simulation model was intended to capture the essential structure common to 
avoidance traditions in both social and non-social domains. Individual agents in a population 
(N = 100 in Figure 5) made repeated decisions between two possible actions [A, B] under 
threat of punishment. None of the actions were associated with external reward. Instead, we 
varied the probability that action B was punished to explore the role of rare punishment in 
avoidance traditions. In contrast to standard game theoretic models of punishment, there was 
no strategic interaction between the individuals. Instead, each agent first (Observation phase) 
observed M number of choices by another, randomly selected, agent (the “Demonstrator” 
agent), and subsequently chose individually M times (Choice phase). To generate a simple 
“birth-death” process, the agents were probabilistically removed (average lifespan = 2M) and 
replaced with completely naïve individuals. The model did not include any heritable traits. 
Each individual was based on a simple RL model (see Equations 4-6), but with an additional 
learning rate parameter that regulated the influence of observed actions on the individuals 
value estimates. The experiments mimicked the structure of the agent-based model, and had a 
computerized setup involving repeated choices between the two options [A, B]. A total of 120 
human volunteers participated after providing written informed consent. Prior to the 
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experimental procedure, each participant was attached to the shock electrodes (all 
experiments except Exp. 2) and the shock amplitude was determined individually to be 
“uncomfortable but not painful”. The participants in all experiments, except Exp. 2, received 
identical instructions. They were informed to avoid electric shocks by choosing between two 
images, that they first  would observe the choices, but not their consequences, of a previous 
participant (Observation phase), and that they thereafter  would do the same task (i.e., choose 
between the same images) themselves during which they might receive shocks based on their 
choices (Choice phase). The purpose of this instruction was to induce an experience of 
threatening punishment. In Exp. 2, the subjects received the same information as in the other 
experiments, but were told that their choices could be awarded by points. These points would 
increase their chance of winning a lottery for extra movie vouchers. They were instructed that 
delivery of points would be signaled with a “$” - symbol. The “$” – symbol was never 
shown. To provide unambiguous and clearly defined social information, we used a computer-
controlled Demonstrator that consistently chose option A in Exp. 1-3. In Exp. 4, we relaxed 
this premise, and allowed the participants to observe the choices of real former experimental 
participants. In Exp. 1 (n = 25), none of the options could actually be punished. In Exp. 2 (n = 
20), the participants were instructed that they could be rewarded, but in reality, none of the 
actions led to reward. In Exp.3 (n = 20), the participants were randomly punished with 
electric shocks, and finally, Exp. 4 (n = 50) had the same setup as Exp. 1, but the participants 
observed the choices of actual prior participants in a transmission chain design (Mesoudi & 
Whiten, 2008). 
 
Results & Conclusion 
Collectively, the results from our agent-based simulation model and the four empirical 
experiments show that omission of threatening punishment (referred to as rewarding 
punishment omission: RPO) in combination with social learning (referred to as behavior 
copying: BC) can underlie the emergence, maintenance, and transmission of both adaptive 
(when actual punishment is possible) and arbitrary (when no actual punishment is possible) 
avoidance traditions (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Study IV. Two typical simulation runs, with (A) and without (B) punishment. In 
(A), behavior B had a 0.5 % risk of being punished.  BC = Behavior Copying, RPO = 
Rewarding Punishment Omission.+ indicates the presence of the learning mechanism and - 
absence of the mechanism. M  = 20, N = 100. 
 
 The four empirical experiments showed that omission of threatening punishment (Exp. 1 & 
Exp. 4), but not reward (Exp. 2) leads to faithful behavioral imitation. Even if actions were 
randomly punished (Exp. 3), the action of the Demonstrator was imitated. Finally, in Exp. 4, 
we established that the rewarding omission of punishment together with social learning can 
transmit avoidance behaviors in an inter-generational fashion as assumed by the agent-based 
model. 
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.  
Figure 6. Study IV. The probability of copying the Demonstrator choice (A) in Experiments 
1-4. ** = p < .01 compared to 0.5. The red lines show the simulated P(A) from the RL model 
with parameter values estimated from the empirical data. Error bars represent 1 SE. 
These findings offer an important complement to traditional game theoretic analyses of 
punishment in strategic interaction by providing a mechanistic, motivational basis for how 
individuals are affected by the threat of (rare) punishment in systems where the actions of 
others can be observed. The proposed mechanisms are consistent with current knowledge 
about the computational and neurobiological basis of learning and value-based decision 
making (Rangel et al., 2008; Seymour et al., 2007), and thereby provides a plausible 
explanation for how exceedingly rare punishment can motivate behavior and how this 
behavior can spread in groups.  
 
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The overall aim of the studies presented in this thesis was to illuminate the psychological and 
computational mechanisms underpinning adaptive behavior based on aversive leaning in 
(simple experimental models of) the social domain. The role of avoidance and punishment in 
the social domain is likely to be of paramount importance for understanding the behavior of 
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both human and non-human animals. Our general approach was to develop simple 
experimental model paradigms that captured the essential underlying structure of (aspects) of 
the social domain in order to characterize the psychological and computational mechanisms 
involved. Here below, I will begin with discussing some aspects of the results of each study, 
and thereafter touch upon some more general theoretical and methodological questions and 
conclusions suggested by these studies. 
In Study I, we investigated how control over action selection in a simple social situation, 
involving decision about the gender of novel human faces, was affected by threat of 
punishment. This question is of importance in both social and nonsocial settings, because 
previous research on cognitive control has generally neglected the consequences of deficient 
control. In line with the functional hypothesis that humans are adapted to avoid costly errors, 
we found that behavioral performance was enhanced during threat of punishment. However, 
we found that this effect was curvilinear (See Figure 1). Performance was enhanced during 
Low threat of punishment, but not during High threat of punishment, relative to the No 
punishment baseline. We speculate that this pattern correspond to the classical inverted-U 
shape function between arousal and performance (Teigen, 1994). Although surprising, this 
finding is an intriguing demonstration that behavior is not necessarily maximally adaptive, 
even when it might be associated with potential fitness costs in natural settings. This pattern 
might be illuminated by the recent view in the field of behavioral ecology that behavior is not 
likely to be adaptive in all circumstances but rather constrained by evolved mechanisms 
shared across domains (Fawcett et al., 2014; McNamara & Houston, 2009)  so that it 
adequate on average (i.e., satisficing rather than maximizing: Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
However, strong conclusions about this pattern of results should await replication studies 
involving a fully parametric manipulation of the cost associated with punishment. Based on 
the proposal that the ACC integrates signals of danger and control demands in order to 
coordinate adaptive behavior (Shackman et al., 2011), and because this brain region enervates 
the muscles of the upper face (Morecraft et al., 2001), we predicted that activity in the 
corrugator supercilii (cEMG) muscle might index the underlying process. In support of this 
prediction, we found that cEMG activity was amplified after response errors, particularly 
during high threat of punishment, and that this activity predicted slower response times on the 
subsequent trial. Moreover, cEMG activity prior to the response predicted performance 
accuracy, in line with influential theories suggesting that the ACC resolves response conflict. 
As outlined in the introduction, one influential theory of ACC function in monitoring of 
action selection states that neural post-error activity in this region (i.e., the ERN) reflects a 
phasic decrease in the firing of mid-brain dopaminerigic following worse than expected 
outcomes or synonymously, a negative prediction error. Our cEMG data fits with this 
account, as the responses to more costly errors during the High threat of punishment 
condition were amplified. However, we did not directly test if cEMG activity correlates with 
prediction errors derived from a RL model, which make this reasoning speculative. 
Replication of our findings using a task suited for RL modeling or with the axiomatic 
approach to the necessary and sufficient criteria for a prediction error signal (Rutledge, Dean, 
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Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010) is thus needed. Such a replication would also tie the findings of 
Study I more tightly to the general value-based decision making framework outlined in the 
introduction. Regardless, Study I provides preliminary evidence for adaptive arbitration 
between habitual and controlled responding during threat of punishment. 
In Study II and III we addressed a core process in value-based decision making by asking 
how the differential value of different social stimuli affects learnt avoidance behaviors. 
Furthermore, both studies shared a common methodological approach, by using two choice 
probabilistic decision making tasks and computational RL modeling as analysis strategy. 
However, the two studies approach the topic from different directions. In Study II, we sought 
to understand how emotional (angry and happy) facial expression could function as 
reinforcers of avoidance learning. Others facial expressions in response to one’s own 
behavior have previously been suggested to play an important role in shaping social 
interaction (Blair, 2003), but research in support of this proposal have remained relatively 
scarce (Heerey, 2013; Lin et al., 2011; Shore & Heerey, 2011). In particular, we investigated 
how preexisting negative attitude to social out-groups (e.g., defined by racial belonging) 
shape such learning. In summary, Study II showed that negative racial bias specifically 
enhanced avoidance learning when one´s actions were reinforced by threatening out-group, 
but not in-group faces. Thus, individual differences in racial bias powerfully modified basic 
emotional learning from the facial expressions of others. Seeking to understand what value-
based decision making process racial bias primarily affected, we formulated a series of RL 
models based on the R-W algorithm. These models implemented two competing hypothesis: 
(i) that differences between the experimental conditions primarily could be explained by 
differences in learning from different types of social reinforcers, or (ii) by differences in 
outcome evaluation of the different social reinforcers (akin to differences in reinforcer 
magnitude). The results supported the first hypothesis. Thus, the different types of social 
reinforcement were similarly valued, but differed in the rate with which they were 
transformed into future avoidance behaviors. Individual differences in racial bias were 
specifically related to the estimated learning rate associated with threatening out-group faces, 
suggesting a computational mechanism for how individual differences in racial bias affects 
learning from social reinforcement delivered by racial out-group individuals. Although not 
conceptualized as such in the published article (Lindström, Selbing, Molapour, & Olsson, 
2014), the value of the learning rate parameters of the R-W model are typically interpreted as 
determined by salience of the CS, or similarly, the attention devoted to processing the CS 
(Pearce & Bouton, 2001). Thus, our results suggest that racial bias, which we understand as a 
type of negative valuation, affects attentional processing of the CS which appear to be in-line 
with research on out-group face recognition (Levin, 2000).  
A related question concern how these effects of racial bias should be understood within the 
general learning theory framework. Regardless of if facial expressions best are 
conceptualized as primary or secondary reinforcers (Blair, 2003; Shore & Heerey, 2011), a 
simple explanation is that individual differences in racial bias reflect individual differences in 
negative experiences with out-group individuals, either by individual or socially-mediated 
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conditioning (see below for discussion). By this account, in- and out-group faces should 
differ in reinforcer magnitude (if secondary reinforcers) or the degree of change in associative 
value due to preconditioning (if primary reinforcers). This was however not what we found, 
as the models based on differences in learning rates (or salience) best explained behavior. 
Thus, the simplest R-W account appears insufficient for accounting for pre-existing 
individual differences. However, it is unclear what alternative account would fare better. 
Instead of investigating social stimuli as reinforcers of avoidance learning, in Study III we 
asked how the intrinsic (i.e., pre-experimental) value of social (and non-social) stimuli affect 
avoidance learning when predicting an aversive reinforcer. The impetus for this question was 
the famous findings in classical conditioning showing enhanced fear acquisition and retarded 
fear extinction to “evolutionary prepared” stimuli such as snakes, angry faces (Ohman & 
Mineka, 2001), and out-group faces (Navarrete et al., 2009; Olsson et al., 2005). Despite the 
possible relevance for a range of real world behaviors, especially in the social domain, the 
influence of such stimuli on voluntary instrumental behavior has been unknown. We 
hypothesized that such stimuli (termed Pavlovian triggers in the manuscript) might trigger the 
Pavlovian valuation system during voluntary behavior and thus induce systematic deviations 
from the predicted instrumental behavior. Put differently, if the Pavlovian and the 
instrumental systems were put in conflict, the intrinsic value of the stimuli should be 
revealed. To asses if a putative evolutionary history would be necessary for these effects to 
emerge, we also included gun stimuli in one experiment. Briefly summarized, we found a 
strong and consistent effect of Pavlovian triggers on instrumental behavior. This influence 
was best accounted for by a RL model where the Pavlovian influence took the form of a fixed 
bias parameter within the Softmax function. Thus, we found that the Pavlovian influence 
biased the instrumentally learned value at the time of choice, resulting in either adaptive or 
maladaptive behavior depending on if the Pavlovian trigger best predicted the aversive 
reinforcer (Figure 4). This conclusion is in concordance with previous modeling-based 
analyses as well as the known neuro-anatomical correlates of the interaction between the 
Pavlovian and instrumental valuation systems (Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 
2014). The RL modeling approach allowed us to quantify the Pavlovian value of the different 
stimuli, which showed that both archetypically prepared stimulus, snakes, and the obviously 
non-prepared gun stimulus hade the same Pavlovian value. This finding, together with the 
rating studies we conducted, which showed a strong similarity in the Pavlovian influence and 
average threat ratings of each stimulus but not with the history of individual negative 
experience, suggest that social and cultural influences on the Pavlovian valuation system 
might be profound (Davey, 1995). An important feature of these data that testify to the 
importance of learning for Pavlovian triggers was the fact that negative racial bias was 
positively correlated with the estimated Pavlovian value of out-group faces (there was no 
comparable correlation for snakes). 
The role of social learning in the acquisition of Pavlovian triggers thus provide an important 
avenue for future research, underscored by the fundamental impact of culture on human 
behavior (Boyd et al., 2011). Even an influential account of evolutionary preparedness theory 
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(Ohman & Mineka, 2001) acknowledges that cultural artifacts with strong cultural threat 
value, such as guns, can come to evoke the same aversive response by engaging the human 
“fear module” similarly to phylogentically fear-relevant stimuli. The details for how 
ontogenetic threats can piggyback on learning systems evolved for phylogenetic threats 
remain unclear.  Our results do obviously not rule out an evolutionary contribution to the 
effect of Pavlovian triggers on behavior, although the magnitude of this contribution must 
remain unspecified. Ongoing work based on evolutionary simulations suggest that  
preparedness is likely to enhance social as well as individual learning (Lindström, Selbing, & 
Olsson, n.d.), but empirical studies remain scarce (Barrett & Broesch, 2012; Cook & Mineka, 
1990; Curio, Ernst, & Vieth, 1978). More generally, it is obvious that the behavioral 
tendencies revealed in Study III can be adaptive in an evolutionary sense, if the Pavlovian 
triggers actually are more predictive of punishment than other stimuli. The Pavlovian 
influence might be viewed as a strong prior (in the Bayesian sense) that allows an 
approximation of Bayesian inference (Marshall, Trimmer, Houston, & McNamara, 2013). An 
interesting venture would therefore be to use evolutionary models to understand and predict 
the environmental conditions leading to such priors, akin to how recent work have modeled 
emotions and moods as ecologically rational priors for decision making (Trimmer, Paul, 
Mendl, McNamara, & Houston, 2013). 
Directly comparing the results of Study II and Study III reveal several important features: 
first, and perhaps unsurprisingly, different social (and non-social) stimuli have clear 
differential influences on avoidance learning in the social domain, and these differences can 
be explained by RL modeling (Ruff & Fehr, 2014), and second, individual differences in 
racial bias are highly important for understanding the basic computational mechanisms 
underlying social interactions involving different social groups. The latter finding is 
surprising, and might have important implications for understanding biased behavior in real 
world settings. Especially, delineating how such biases can be reduced is obviously of pivotal 
importance. I will return to related issues below when discussing the consequences of 
adaptive sampling for social behavior.  
A direct comparison also reveals a puzzling discrepancy: the results of the RL modeling gave 
contrasting accounts of the underlying mechanisms.  As described above, these studies 
address two sides of the same topic; social stimuli as reinforcers (Study II), and as cues or 
targets for actions (Study III). It is likely that the difference between these processes is 
reflected in the discrepant results. In Study II, we found that behavior was best accounted for 
by an RL model where different social reinforcers were associated with different learning 
rates (and not by different outcome magnitudes) and that individual differences in racial bias 
correlated selectively with the estimated learning rate for threatening out-group faces. In 
contrast, in Study III, we found that behavior best was described by a model where the 
stimulus elicited a fixed (Pavlovian) bias at the time of choice, rather than affecting the 
learning rate. Similarly, individual differences in racial bias were correlated with this 
Pavlovian bias parameter. Currently, it is unclear how to best reconcile these two models into 
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a unified account, which obviously is needed for understanding the computational 
mechanisms involved in avoidance learning in the social domain. 
The results of Study II and Study III share a common caveat: computational modeling is 
associated with important limitations. No computational model, especially not one at the high 
level of abstraction used in Study II-III, is likely to provide a complete account of the 
processes underlying complex behavior. Furthermore, conclusions from model comparisons 
are contingent on the selected set of candidate models. Although, in theory, an unknown 
number of other models are possible, only a limited number of models can be tested 
(McClelland, 2009). Thus, while the results support particular candidate hypothesis, there are 
likely (many) other hypotheses consistent with the behavioral data. This caveat points to the 
importance of using several kinds of data, such as neuroimaging or single cell recordings, and 
models placed at different levels of Marr´s explanational framework (Marr, 1982; 
McClamrock, 1991), to constrain theory construction. Ideally, the models formulated in 
Study II-III should also be reconstructed with a high degree of biological realism, for 
example as detailed neural networks, to show that the known principles of nervous systems 
operating within the neural architecture of the human value-based decision making systems 
could reproduce the behavioral results (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). 
In Study IV, we expanded the basic value-based decision framework to include social 
learning from the actions of others (Seymour et al., 2007). Specifically, we sought to provide 
a computational basis for how rare or non-existent punishment can generate widespread 
behavioral avoidance traditions, and thereby promoting, for example, norms of cooperation or 
food taboos (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2010). The economic and 
evolutionary literatures on social norms and traditions have generally been silent on the 
psychological mechanisms underpinning observed behavior. We hypothesized that the 
rewarding quality of avoiding an aversive outcome (see Table 1) might provide the 
motivational building block needed for such avoidance traditions, together with a social 
learning mechanism allowing avoidance behavior to be transmitted between individuals. As 
predicted, we found in four experiments that these mechanisms together can underlie 
avoidance behaviors by showing that humans are extremely prone to copy the behavior of 
others when in situations where punishment (electric shock) is possible (see Figure 6) and to 
transmit this behavior to other individuals in an intergenerational fashion. 
An important part of Study IV was to provide a proof of principle that punishment omission 
and social learning together can generate, maintain, and transmit large scale avoidance 
traditions (Figure 5). To do this, a novel methodological approach was introduced; we used 
agent-based simulation models to investigate the emergent consequences of punishment 
omission and social learning in tandem in populations of simple agents. This modeling 
approach is widely appreciated and used within biology (DeAngelis & Mooij, 2005) and parts 
of the social sciences (Bonabeau, 2002), but relatively unknown within psychology (Smith & 
Conrey, 2007). However, in my opinion, agent-based simulation has the potential to provide 
bridges between detailed individual-level psychological (and neural) mechanisms and the 
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resulting behavior in groups and populations; a mechanistic linkage between micro and 
macro - levels of explanation (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Furthermore, such models allow 
investigating the evolution of psychological computational mechanisms in populations of 
agents, and thereby provide a link between the mechanistic and functional levels of analysis 
of Tinbergen´s framework (Fawcett et al., 2012; McNamara & Houston, 2009; Nolfi, Parisi, 
& Elman, 1994; Trimmer et al., 2012). Obviously, however, models are most powerful when 
clearly related to empirical data. In Study IV, we confirmed the assumptions underlying the 
agent-based simulation by testing the basic predictions across four experiments, where we 
also used a model-fitting approach to confirm that human behavior correspond to the 
parameter range needed to reliably produce traditions in the simulation model. Thus, the 
empirical experiments were used to constrain the simulation model, which in turn was used to 
extrapolate from the results of the empirical experiments (c.f., Rand, Tarnita, Ohtsuki, & 
Nowak, 2013). 
However, it is worth asking how general the findings of Study IV are in terms of different 
time scales and types of punishments. The agent-based simulations model makes no 
assumptions about either: the general pattern of results is predicted to generalize to any 
situations with the same underlying structure and where the psychological impact of avoiding 
threatening punishment is potent enough. Such simplicity in the modeling formulation is 
commonly seen as a virtue because the model might reveal explanatory generalities across 
many situations (Evans et al., 2013). It can, however, also be criticized for not actually 
corresponding to any natural system (Evans et al., 2013). Our experimental tests of the model 
assumptions, however, are naturally limited to a specific timescale (brief) and one type of 
punishment (electric shocks). Furthermore, the experiments mainly pertain to arbitrary 
avoidance traditions since sufficiently rare punishment for adaptive avoidance traditions 
could not be experimentally administered. This situation is common to many experimental 
tests of theoretical models, such as the Prisoner´s Dilemma. The Prisoner´s Dilemma is 
commonly considered to have far reaching implications for human behavior at different time 
scales and in a variety of payoff currencies, but experimental tests are normally restricted to 
the behavioral laboratory with monetary payoffs (Guala, 2012). The discrepancy between 
theoretical scope and experimental tests is a topic of debate (Guala, 2012), but there is 
however a general agreement that lab experiments are important for model and theory 
development, and that simple models do contribute to understanding of complex phenomena 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Janssen, Holahan, Lee, & Ostrom, 2010).  
Finally, one might consider if there are any general mechanisms by which the specific 
mechanisms identified in the studies of this thesis might influence everyday behavior. One 
such mechanism likely to mediate the influence of socially mediated valuations on learning 
and decision making is adaptive sampling. Adaptive sampling refers to the simple fact that if 
the value of an option is unknown, the only way to discover its value is by sampling it. If the 
outcome is favorable (relative to other options for example) the probability of choosing it 
again will increase and similarly, if the outcome was unfavorable, the future probability of 
choosing the option will decrease. This is exactly what the simple RL models used in this 
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thesis assumes. Such adaptive sampling will, for example, result in risk aversion due to the 
simple fact that high variance options often will result in unfavorable outcomes and that the 
true expected value of the uncertain option thus never is correctly estimated (Denrell, 2007). 
Of specific relevance to the social domain is the fact that negative initial outcomes, due to 
high variance or other factors, will decrease the future willingness to sample the option again. 
If the options are interactions with specific individuals, it is easy to see that this process can 
result in avoidance of a particular individual if the initial experience was negative and there is 
no extrinsic motivation for interacting with the individual again (Denrell, 2005). False 
negative initial expressions will thus remain uncorrected, whereas false positive expression 
will be corrected due to continued interactions. This process might for example contribute to 
inter-group biases and ostracism (Denrell, 2005). It is easy to see that the findings of Study II 
and III imply that this sampling based avoidance process will be amplified for certain stimuli 
or due to prior negative attitudes. For example, adaptive sampling could cause even a mild 
Pavlovian bias to decrease the probability of learning the true value of an option, such as 
interacting with an out-group member, which could have dramatic consequences for the 
future behavioral trajectory (Denrell, 2005). This pattern could be seen in Study III when 
choosing the Pavlovian trigger represented the optimal action. Due to the Pavlovian 
influence, the participants instead tended to oversample the sub-optimal action, and thereby 
never accurately estimating the value of the other (optimal) option. Similarly, Study II 
showed that individuals with high racial bias learned faster than low bias individuals to avoid 
threatening out-group members, and would thus less be likely to revise their impression 
through future interactions. One factor that can either exaggerate or reduce such biases is 
social learning. Social learning can provide information about the outcomes of non-sampled 
options, which can reduce risk aversion (Arbilly, Motro, Feldman, & Lotem, 2011; Fazio, 
Eiser, & Shook, 2004). However, social learning can also propagate false negative 
impressions of the options, which thereafter are unlikely to be corrected by individual 
sampling (Fazio et al., 2004). In Study IV, we saw that social learning thus could underlie 
arbitrary avoidance traditions. 
Together, the four studies included in this thesis show, in line with a growing literature (Ruff 
& Fehr, 2014), that basic value-based decision mechanisms play an important role in shaping 
social behavior in response to punishment and threats of punishment. Understanding the role 
of these mechanisms in social behavior might function as an important building block for 
bridging the questions of how and why (Bateson & Laland, 2013) through evolutionary 
modeling, and as a starting points for more detailed analysis at all levels of mechanistic 
explanation (Marr, 1982), 
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